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REGIONAL SECURITY 
 
 
 
The authors employ geopolitical 
analysis to identify the core character-
istics of NATO’s current policy to-
wards the Baltic Sea region. After the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the region 
was considered as one of the safest in 
terms of military security. However, in 
the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the 
region has witnessed a growing ten-
sion in relations between NATO and 
the Russian Federation. A comparative 
analysis of NATO’s official documents 
on the Baltics shows that the chief pre-
text for increased military presence in 
the region is the alleged need to de-
fend the Baltic states from the Russian 
threat. Special attention is paid to the 
attempts of Western military strate-
gists to encourage the neutral Nordic 
states — Sweden and Finland — to ac-
cede to NATO. This would lead to the 
organisation’s northern enlargement. 
The current situation suggests that to 
ease tension in the Baltic Sea region 
Russia has not only to respond ade-
quately to emerging military threats 
but also to launch an awareness cam-
paign to explain its position and dispel 
the myth about Russia preparing to 
start a hybrid war against the Baltic 
States. 
 
Keywords: NATO, Baltic Sea, po-
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Introduction 
 
In November 2016, President 
Vladimir Putin approved a new ver-
sion of the “Foreign Policy Concept 
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of the Russian Federation” [1]. Only three years have passed since the ap-
proval of the previous Concept but this short period was so full of serious 
changes in world politics that the necessity of its updating became evident. 
The Ukrainian crisis after Euromaidan, the introduction of anti-Russia 
sanctions and countersanctions, growing activity of the “Islamic State” in 
the Middle East had a serious impact on the foreign policy of our coun-
try. That is why alongside with the reconfirmation of the principles and 
approaches declared in the 2013 Concept the new edition contains a 
number of changes. 
Thus, in the 2016 Concept we see new aspects concerning the rela-
tions with the West. Paragraph 61 criticizes the containment policy 
adopted by the NATO and EU member-states against Russia; their policy 
runs counter to the growing need for cooperation and addresses transna-
tional challenges and threats in today’s world [1, с. 51]. Special attention 
in this connection is paid to the necessity for Russia to “build its relations 
with NATO taking into account the degree to which the Alliance is ready 
to engage in equitable partnership, strictly adhere to the norms and prin-
ciples of international law, take real steps towards a common space of 
peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region based on the 
principles of mutual trust, transparency and predictability, to ensure the 
compliance by all its members with the commitment undertaken within 
the Russia — NATO Council to refrain from seeking to ensure one’s se-
curity at the expense of the security of other States, as well as with mili-
tary restraint obligations as per the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization of May 27, 1997” [1, с. 27—28]. Therefore the 
Russian Federation maintains “its negative perspective towards NATO’s 
expansion, the Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching Russian 
borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia, 
viewing them as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible secu-
rity and leading to the deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to 
the emergence of new ones” [1, с. 28]. 
In order to withstand such tendencies it is very important to identify 
the reasons for and consequences of the visible growth of confrontation 
between NATO and the Russian Federation in the Baltic Sea region. 
Though this question has been raised already by such specialists as 
N. Mezhevich [2; 3], Yu. Zverev [3], K. Khudoley [4], A. Nosovich [5; 
6], S. Zalevsky [7], V. Volovoj, I. Batorshina [8], V. Konyshev, A. Ser-
gunin, S. Subbotin [9] and others, the results of our research are not only 
relevant but are quite new as they are based on the latest NATO docu-
ments, officials speeches, works of analysts and experts from the North 
Atlantic Alliance that for the most part had not been scrutinized by Rus-
sian political scientists. It gives us an opportunity to reveal the real objec-
tives and intentions of the NATO strategists regarding the Baltics in to-
day’s confrontation with Russia. 
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The Baltic Sea Region in the North Atlantic Alliance Strategy —  
a Change of Priorities 
 
There is no doubt that the Baltic Sea is of special geopolitical signifi-
cance for both Russia and a number of European countries — NATO 
member states and those that keep their neutral status. On one hand, the 
military forces of the NATO Alliance and those of the Collective Securi-
ty Treaty Organization (CSTO) contact here directly. On the other hand, 
the importance of the Baltics regarding global economy, trade develop-
ment and the direct access to the World Ocean is beyond any doubt. 
NATO in the context of the geopolitical evaluation of the regional 
situation should be understood in two ways. Firstly, as a political and 
military multilateral actor, and secondly, as a framework for cooperation 
used by the United States for strengthening its position in this part of the 
global geopolitical space. For a certain period of time the NATO, strategy 
did not focus on the Baltic Sea region as a priority area of potential mili-
tary conflicts. The Baltic Sea region used to appear on the agenda only 
when some incidents occurred: for example, NATO analysts mention in 
this respect the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, which they attributed to 
Russia [10]. But after Crimea’s reunification with Russia the situation 
has changed drastically as the Baltic states are now considered by the 
NATO (especially, Americans) strategists as the next target for Russia’s 
‘aggression’ on the post-Soviet territory. From this point of view, there is 
a direct link between NATO and the USA role in global politics. Jan 
Hanska, a Finnish defense specialist, argues that, even if the Baltic Sea 
region has never been a high-priority area in US geostrategy, the super-
structure of NATO ties the US to its stability to such a large degree that, 
should the US fail to protect its allies in the area, the whole credibility of 
its foreign policy and strategy would collapse. Even if the Baltic Sea re-
gion is not of direct importance to the US, it cannot afford to stand on the 
sidelines” [11, с. 15]. 
During the Cold War, the American policy toward the Baltic Sea re-
gion was built on containment of the USSR by strengthening allies and 
exerting pressure on neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland. This 
was done both openly and behind the scenes. In the President Ronald 
Reagan era, the focus was not on the Baltic region per se, but rather on 
the countries along the borders of the Eastern Bloc. After the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, Estonia 
and Latvia in 1993—1994, the USA was eager to increase its influence, 
but not actual presence, in the region. Instead, the NATO framework was 
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used. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was introduced as a first 
step towards membership in the Alliance. After the Baltic States joined 
NATO in 2004 and the war on terrorism intensified in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, the Baltic Sea region was considered one of the most peaceful plac-
es of the world and the American interest in its military presence here 
reduced. The NATO exercise Steadfast Jazz in autumn 2013, which was 
to signal strategic reassurance to the Baltic States and Poland and shed 
light on the new NATO Response Force (NRF), only attracted an Ameri-
can participation with 160 people (compared to France 1,200 and Poland 
1,040) [12]. It was a sign not only of USA reduced defense budget, but 
also of its assessment of low tensions in the Baltic region. 
Now, as we have already mentioned, the Baltic Sea begins to play a 
central role in the strategic confrontation between Russia and the West, 
so we have to look at the USA and NATO strategy in this region. 
 
 
The Baltic States Security as a Declared Aim  
for the NATO Growing Presence in the Region 
 
During the last years of Barak Obama’s presidency it became obvious 
that the United States wanted to strengthen its presence in the Baltic under 
the pretext of the need to protect the Baltic countries from Russia. An 
analysis of numerous materials prepared by both American military experts 
and pro-American leaders in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and a number of 
Nordic countries seems to be convincing enough to testify to this [13—19]. 
Let us try to analyze the most typical and important positions from the 
point of view of security that are reflected in them. 
The main concern is the fact that from the military point of view, the 
Baltic States — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — are isolated from other 
NATO members. It could be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to re-
spond to an incident in the Baltic Sea region without the acquiescence of 
non-NATO countries. That is why the main task is to make Finland and 
Sweden a part of the NATO, and to make the ruling elites of these coun-
tries change their neutral status. 
The Nordic countries play an important role in guaranteeing the secu-
rity of the Baltic States. They have close relationship based on their cul-
tural and historical commonality. Denmark and Norway have done a lot 
to develop Baltic military capabilities since the collapse of the USSR, 
and Sweden and Finland, although not members of NATO have a close 
security relationship with them. At the same time, much concern is ex-
pressed about the dependence on non-NATO Sweden and Finland, which 
being important allies for the USA and loyal partners of NATO are not 
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obligated to come to the assistance of any NATO member in the event of 
an armed attack. The USA should be prepared for such a situation. In 
connection with this, the case of Afghanistan — a landlocked Central 
Asian country several thousand miles away from the continental United 
States — is worth mentioning. The USA intervention had a questionable, 
and at times wavering support from neighbouring countries and from 
countries having poor regional infrastructure. However, it did not prevent 
Americans from conducting full-scaled military operations there. The 
conclusion is that with the right planning and preparation the USA and 
NATO could do the same in the Baltics, even with Russia’s Anti-
Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the region and even without 
Sweden or Finland’s support (though it will be not easy). 
Historical examples that prove the necessity for military operations to 
have an access to Swedish and Finnish airspace, sea, and land are used as 
additional arguments. For example, during the Crimean War (1853—
1856) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918—
1920), the Swedish fortress of Viapori (known today as Suomenlinna in 
Finland) and the Åland Islands played a crucial role. During both World 
Wars, the Skagerrak and Øresund Straits — both of which border Swe-
dish waters and serve as a gateway to the Baltic Sea—were highly con-
tested. During the Cold War, Denmark’s Bornholm Island was an area of 
contention between the Soviet Union and NATO. In the 21st century 
these considerations have not disappeared. 
The Danish Straits consist of three channels — Øresund, the Great 
Belt and the Little Belt — connecting the Baltic Sea to the North Sea via 
the Kattegat and Skagerrak Seas. These straits serve the Baltic Sea coun-
tries as import and export routes. They are especially important for Rus-
sia, which has increasingly shipped its crude oil exports to Europe through 
them [20, с. 225]. Overall, approximately 125,000 ships per year transit 
these straits. The conclusion is made that if the USA needed to intervene 
militarily in the Baltic States, access to the Danish Straits would be vital. 
According to American strategists, it would be naïve in the extreme to 
think that Russia did not factor the importance of these three islands and 
the Danish Straits into their Baltic Sea contingency planning. It would be 
just as irresponsible for the U. S. not to do the same [21]. 
Another extremely important matter in the military confrontation in 
the Baltics is the Kaliningrad Oblast. American specialists have the fol-
lowing vision of the situation: Kaliningrad is a small Russian exclave 
along the Baltic Sea (slightly larger than Connecticut), bordering both 
Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad is part of Russia’s Western Military 
District, and approximately 25,000 Russian soldiers and security person-
nel are stationed there. It is home to Russia’s Baltic Navy, which consists 
of around 50 vessels, including submarines. However, the most important 
fact is that Kaliningrad is the heart of Russia’s A2/AD strategy [21]. 
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Russia has the advanced S400 air defense system in Kaliningrad. In 
October 2016, it deployed Iskander-M missiles there. The Kremlin 
spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained that it was Russia’s reaction to 
NATO creating an “entire anti-Russian missile system” in Europe [22]. 
NATO strategists are mainly worried that these missiles can carry nuclear 
or conventional warheads and have a range of 250 miles, placing Riga, 
Vilnius, and Warsaw within their reach. Besides, Russia has facilities for 
storage of tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region. Whether 
nuclear weapons are presently there is a matter of much debate. Western 
Russia is modernizing runways at its Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye air 
bases in Kaliningrad that can be used to fly near NATO airspace. It is 
Russian planes flying from or to the airbases in Kaliningrad that are 
blamed for causing aerial incidents with NATO planes. 
American specialists have no doubts that Russia’s A2/AD coverage 
over the Baltic Region, coupled with Finland and Sweden’s reluctance to 
join NATO, makes defending the Baltic States a highly difficult task. 
That is why they propose a number of measures that could help the USA 
to fulfill their NATO obligations concerning Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia [21]. 
Firstly, to make all possible steps in order to improve relations with 
the Nordic countries. Automatically it will lead to developing coopera-
tion with the Baltic States that are under strong influence of the North 
European states 
Secondly, to encourage Finland and Sweden to join NATO. The very 
wording of this task is worth citing: “Ultimately, the Swedish and Finnish 
populations will decide whether to join NATO, but the U. S. should pur-
sue a policy that encourages NATO membership for these two Nordic 
countries. Until they join NATO, they will not benefit from the Alli-
ance’s security guarantee”. 
Thirdly, to prepare contingency operations to defend the Baltics that 
do not include support from Finland and Sweden. The U. S. should plan 
and rehearse defense of the Baltic States without these two countries. 
“However unlikely this might be, until Finland and Sweden become full 
members of NATO, it would be irresponsible for U. S. military strategists 
not to plan this scenario”. This training should include scenarios in which 
Russian forces capture the Åland Islands and Gotland. 
Fourthly, to prepare for a fast military reinforcement of Europe. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the USA could move conventional military forces rap-
idly from the United States to Germany in the event of a war with the 
Soviet Union. The USA should consider holding a similar exercise fo-
cused on defending the Baltic States. 
It is also necessary to pay special attention to the so-called “Kali-
ningrad Factor”. The USA needs to work with its NATO allies to develop 
a strategy dealing with the Russian A2/AD capabilities in Kaliningrad. In 
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particular, this requires close cooperation and planning with Poland. “No 
credible defense of the Baltics can be carried out without neutralizing the 
threat from Kaliningrad”. 
And finally, “Moscow should not interpret Sweden and Finland’s 
non-NATO status as a green light to intervene in the Baltic States be-
cause NATO cannot come to their defense. Conversely, until they decide 
to become full-fledged members of NATO, Stockholm and Helsinki 
should not expect the Alliance to come automatically to their assistance if 
they are attacked by Russia, and NATO members should not give that 
impression. NATO needs to plan for all eventualities in the Baltics—
otherwise Russia will take advantage of the situation”. 
 
 
Hybrid Wars in the Baltics — a Myth or Reality? 
 
A number of western experts think that in case of a conflict between 
Russia and the Baltic States there are high chances for the involvement of 
the Russian-speaking minorities in it that will give Russia an opportunity 
to use the idea of their rights protection for justifying military interven-
tion. The former NATO adviser on security matters, retired Major Gen-
eral Frank van Kappen, a member of the upper house of the Parliament of 
the Netherlands, presupposes that activities in the spirit of a modern ‘hy-
brid war’ could be the following ones [23]: “Putin in any case is not go-
ing to enter the Baltic States in a tank, because then he would openly de-
clares war on NATO. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an 
attack on one NATO country is an attack on all member countries. In-
stead, we can see the same scenario that has been observed so far. One 
can, for example, escalate the situation in the Estonian town of Narva, 
where many Russians live. Another hybrid war, contacts with local or-
ganizations, and then Narva declares independence. Estonia reacts harshly. 
Russia declares its duty to protect Narva’s Russian speaking population 
from neo-Nazis. If Russia attacked Estonia, then everything would be sim-
ple. It would be a war against NATO, and he would lose it. I am absolutely 
sure. The price of war is millions of lives. However, nobody wants a war. 
If Putin resorts to a hybrid war, then NATO will not resort to Article 5. 
Simply a new People's Republic of Narva will be proclaimed. Narva will 
ask to join Russia. Is it a reason for applying Article 5? And if not, then 
all NATO members from Eastern Europe will exclaim: NATO is worth 
nothing. In this sense, Putin will score NATO a goal”. 
Estonian experts from the International Centre for Defense and Secu-
rity Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks [15], analyzing the same scenario, 
think that Russia would make a decision, depending on NATO and EU’s 
reaction, and the degree of resilience of the attacked countries. In the 
worst case, such a conflict would evolve into a full- scale war. 
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At the same time, in their opinion, the Kremlin attempts to follow any 
Donbas-like scenario (no matter what they consider it to be) in the Baltic 
States would have notable limitations and deficiencies. First, the Kremlin 
has not achieved its desired results in Ukraine with these tactics. Second, 
the North Atlantic Alliance and its “Eastern Flank” have carefully studied 
Russia’s “hybrid warfare” and Ukraine’s counter actions, which would 
help if necessary to respond swiftly and adequately. In addition, in this 
case Russia would compromise its primary advantage — rapidly gaining 
the initiative and upper hand by exploiting the elements of surprise and 
time. The first days would be crucial, and if Russia hesitated to intervene 
militarily, the Allies would likely have time to respond and take control 
of the situation. More than that, without unambiguous Russian military 
support, the “separatists” would have little chance to control sections of 
Russia’s borders with the Baltic States, which would be vital for their 
success. However, Russian military support would lead inevitably to 
open conflict with NATO. 
Another scenario widely discussed in NATO is a Russian military in-
cursion following a sudden incident (i. e. a provocation). Western mili-
tary specialists accuse the Russian armed forces (especially airborne 
troops, army aviation etc.) of constant preparation for such scenarios by 
training for example the takeover of “unknown airfields” just behind the 
eastern borders of Latvia and Estonia, e. g. military exercises in the Pskov 
Oblast taken place from 15 to 20 February 2016 with the participation 0f 
2,500 troops. 
Such a sudden “incursion” would undoubtedly surprise the attacked 
nation and NATO, and might be exploited by Russia to demonstrate the 
Alliance’s vulnerability and inability to defend its entire territory, and to 
provoke political divisions in the Western camp. Nevertheless, such an 
overt aggression would automatically be seen as an act of war against 
NATO (Article 5), which would lead to a political, economic and mili-
tary response. 
The third scenario, described by NATO strategists, is based on the 
idea that Russia will try to separate the Baltic states from the rest of the 
territory controlled by NATO and then will occupy them. In this context 
they mention large-scale military exercises “Zapad”, involving the West-
ern MD and other forces, and “Union Shield” together with Belarus), as 
well as massive no-notice combat control exercises (e. g. in December 
2014 and March 2015). According to the western military specialists, 
Russia has attacked Georgia in August 2008 and Ukraine closely follow-
ing such scenarios. This would be a far bigger political blow to NATO 
and the EU that — if successful — would also allow Russia uncontested 
strategic military advantage in the Baltic Sea area, and could possibly 
“solve” the question of the Kaliningrad exclave. The Kremlin would have 
no problem finding a pretext, especially if US/NATO-Russian relations 
become critical elsewhere (e. g. in Syria). 
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NATO experts are forced to recognize the fact that Russia has proved 
its ability to impose effectively A2/AD in the maritime environment and 
the airspace surrounding the Baltic States. The conclusion is that a Rus-
sian invasion through Belorussian territory towards the Kaliningrad Ob-
last through the 100 km wide Suwałki Gap (Polish and Lithuanian territo-
ry), coupled with operations against Estonia and Latvia from the Lenin-
grad and Pskov Oblasts could follow the air and maritime blockade if 
NATO did not react in a timely and forceful manner, and did not have a 
proper forward presence in place. 
The main conclusion is the following one: while any of the scenarios 
described above may occur, NATO’s military planners must be aware 
that Russia — even if it does not wish a large-scale war with NATO — 
would not miss a opportunity to benefit from NATO’s political differ-
ences and sub-regional weakness in the Baltic Sea area. 
 
 
Donald Trump and the “Baltic Problem” 
 
The main question today is whether there have been any changes in 
the NATO Baltic Sea strategy since President Trump and his team came 
to power in the USA. Donald Trump statements during his electoral cam-
paign regarding NATO and particularly the Baltic States caused panic 
among political elites of this region. They were worried by his answer to 
the question about his commitment to defending NATO allies if an ene-
my attacks them. He said that he would first look at their contribution to 
the alliance [24]. Moreover, the situation in this sphere was not as fa-
vourable as the American administration would like it to be: Estonia met 
its defense commitment spending a little bit more than 2 % of GDP, the 
basic minimum on defense, the situation with Latvia and Lithuania was 
much worse. The governments of these two countries had given a prom-
ise to the previous USA administration during the Baltic Forum held in 
Riga in August 2016 and attended by Vice-President Joseph Biden to in-
crease defense spending [25]. These promises were given in the situation 
when the Baltic allies of the USA expected a considerable financial help 
from Washington. 
As it was stressed after the meeting in Riga, "each of the Baltic al-
lies has received more than $ 30 million" within the framework of the 
American programme for supporting the European Allies for NATO. 
Only in 2016, each of the three countries received more than $ 9 million 
[25]. Now it will not be easy for the Baltic countries, especially for Lat-
via, given their economic situation, to increase their contribution to 
NATO. At the same time, it should be noted that other countries of the 
North Atlantic Alliance do not all share calls for increasing military 
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spending. Thus, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabri-
el during his visit to Estonia in March 2017 reminded about the lessons 
of the World War II, stressing the fact that the increase in military 
spending would inevitably cause concerns among neighbouring coun-
tries. Earlier, in February European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker said in his speech on the sidelines of the international Munich 
Security Conference that Europe must not cave in to U.S demands to 
raise military spending, arguing that development and humanitarian aid 
could also count as security [6]. 
Despite the change of power in the White House, it is difficult to im-
agine that the new American administration will someday reject the idea 
of NATO expansion in the Baltic Sea region, or the idea of making Fin-
land and Sweden join the Allience. No wonder that during the visit of the 
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to Finland in March 2017, the ‘Russian ag-
gression’ was habitually discussed, but the main attention was paid to the 
military contribution of Finland to the counter-ISIS fight [27]. In any 
case, we are sure that the key role will be played not by the United States 
but by public opinion and political elites of the Nordic countries. Sweden 
may make some practical steps in NATO direction only after the 2018 
parliamentary elections if the Moderates and their potential right-wing 
allies win. The current centre-left government does not think it necessary 
for the country to become a NATO member. Peter Hultqvist, the defense 
minister reiterated his opposition to joining NATO, despite recognizing a 
rising threat from Russia. “Whatever happens, the countries around the 
Baltic Sea need to keep together. However, the solution for us is not a 
NATO membership. We have our geographic position and our own histo-
ry, as does Finland”. Mr. Hultqvist said Sweden was increasing its mili-
tary capabilities and boosting its relationships with two other Baltic coun-
tries, Poland and Germany [28]. 
At the same time Donald Trump's unpredictability is used as a new 
argument by NATO supporters who are trying to prove to the Swedish 
society that under the new US administration the bilateral defense agree-
ment signed by Sweden and Finland with the Barack Obama administra-
tion can be inadequate [29]. The main argument is that cooperation with 
28 states, and not one (even if it is as powerful as the USA), can be more 
effective. 
The Finnish government is against seeking a NATO membership at 
the moment but keeps this option in mind. Alex Stubb, the former Finn-
ish prime minister, wrote recently in the Financial Times that he was 
concerned Mr Trump could do a deal with President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia to stop NATO enlargement. “This would leave a security political 
vacuum in northern Europe, especially Finland and Sweden . . . [whose] 
‘NATO option’ would be made null and void,” he added [30]. 
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We should not think that "President Trump will leave the Baltic 
States as they are" [5]. Firstly, the defense cooperation agreements signed 
in January 2017 by the previous US administration with Lithuania and 
Estonia, which formalize the deployment of new military units in these 
countries and the status of American servicemen is still in effect [31]. 
Secondly, since the beginning of 2017, in the framework of the so-called 
strengthening of the "Eastern Flank" of the Alliance, the forces and assets 
of the US 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team and the battalion tactical 
groups of the bloc member countries arrived in Poland and the Baltic 
States, which together with the national armed forces continued to im-
prove the Baltic bridgehead [32]. 
No matter what Donald Trump’s personal opinion is, he has to take 
into account the system of military-political relations that has already de-
veloped in the United States and in the world, the geopolitical interests of 
America and their interpretation by the country's power elites, the nature 
and degree of influence of the military-industrial complex on the political 
decision-making process in Washington. In this respect, it seems appro-
priate to quote an abstract from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
“Farewell Address” delivered 17 January 1961: “In the councils of gov-
ernment, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The po-
tential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties 
or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an 
alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the 
huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful 
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together” 
[33]. We are sure that it is the interests of the military-industrial complex 
that are behind the escalation of tension in Russian-American relations. 
And it is extremely difficult to resist them. Hence, we can assume that 
even if there is some softening of bellicose rhetoric, the strengthening of 
pragmatism in US foreign policy, the Baltic region will unfortunately 
remain the arena of confrontation between NATO and Russia. 
At the same time, certain shifts in the US policy will inevitably influ-
ence the position of the NATO leaders, since it is this country that plays a 
system-building role in this military-political organization. Thus, NATO 
chief Jens Stoltenberg during his official visit to Denmark in March 2017 
had to confess: “NATO sees the concern about terrorism and cyber at-
tacks, but we don’t see any imminent threat against any NATO ally, in-
cluding the Baltic States” [34]. 
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that, as American de-
fense expert Samuel Gardiner points out, the security of the Baltic States 
is not included in the top 10 most important topics for the new US admin-
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istration [5]. Obviously, for President Donald Trump, problems related to 
the Middle East and North Korea seem much more important, which, 
however, does not mean a loss of interest in the Baltic region, which is a 
zone of direct contact between NATO and Russia. Hence, one can con-
clude with some confidence that the situation in the Baltics directly de-
pends on the general context of the relationship in the framework of the 
US-Europe-Russia triangle. Meanwhile we have to agree with the opinion 
of the President of the Russian Association of Baltic Studies N. M. Me-
zhevich that "the geopolitical configuration in the Baltic region acquires 
an increasingly pronounced character ‘all against Russia’ or ‘Russia 
against all’. It does not answer the interests neither of the European Un-
ion, nor of Russia, and in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion 
creates the potential threat of escalating misjudgments into a direct mili-
tary confrontation with unpredictable consequences" [2]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the NATO experts and generals’ views on the security 
problems in the Baltic Sea region allows us to draw a number of conclu-
sions. 
Firstly, there is an obvious trend toward a direct confrontation with 
Russia. As an excuse, the situation in Ukraine and the problem of Crimea 
are used. However, if there were not a Ukrainian crisis, the situation in 
the Baltic would worsen anyway. The very logic of the development of 
relations between Russia and NATO in recent years is a quite convincing 
evidence of this. 
Secondly, the main goal is to involve neutral states — Sweden and 
Finland — in the orbit of the Alliance's activities. Thus, the expansion of 
NATO to the East is complemented by the desire to expand it to the 
North, which certainly worries Russia and, first of all, its bordering re-
gions with Finland — the Leningrad Oblast and the Republic of Karelia. 
If these two countries join NATO it will not only increase tension in the 
region, but also inevitably lead to significant additional defense spending 
by the RF. At the same time there is a polarization of public opinion in 
Finland and Sweden, a growing split in the society over the issue of 
NATO membership and relations with Russia. 
Thirdly, the hysteria over Russia's aggressive intentions in the Baltic 
region is also used for solving financial problems. It is quite natural that 
the USA seeks to pass part of the military spending on its NATO allies, 
who, without seeing a direct military threat to themselves, are reluctant to 
take steps that are unpopular among voters. At the NATO summit in 
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Wales in 2014, it was agreed that each of the member countries would 
allocate at least 2 % of their budget for defense. However, this agreement 
has not yet been implemented by all [35, c. 50]. 
Fourthly, pointing out on the internal vulnerability of the Baltic States 
that have a significant percentage of the Russian-speaking population, 
NATO strategists practically do not even raise the issue of the ethnopolit-
ical tension causes, do not call for the development and implementation 
of programs for their integration into the society, which would increase 
the level of loyalty of Russian-speaking communities to the countries of 
their permanent residence, thereby leaving no opportunity for Russia to 
win them over. 
Fifthly, the focus of NATO and, above all, the United States on 
strengthening its presence in the Baltic Sea region (in the broad sense of 
this concept) threatens the ties that have developed as a result of many 
years of cooperation between the Baltic countries, including Russia. The 
emphasis on the military component clearly draws lines of division be-
tween NATO member states (Denmark, Poland, Germany, the Baltic 
countries and Norway), neutral states (Sweden, Finland), and the CSTO 
allies (Russia and Belarus). 
Sixthly, assessing the NATO overall strategy as a military-political 
bloc, it is necessary to take into account the existing differences among 
members of this organization in understanding the situation and their 
readiness to follow Washington policy. And here we are talking not only 
about the traditional opposition of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, typical of 
the political process within the EU, but also about a more complex con-
figuration based on the attitude towards Russia and its individual political 
decisions. 
The increasing tension in the Baltic Sea region causes a great concern 
to Russia that is forced to retaliate to growing NATO presence in the re-
gion. In this respect, not denying the importance of the military compo-
nent, we would like to accentuate the necessity of intensifying the infor-
mation efforts to explain the Russian position with regard to the most 
acute problems in relations with the Baltic countries, Sweden and Finland 
in order to prevent speculations about the real interests of the Russian 
Federation in the region. 
The military rhetoric of NATO strategists, accompanying the discus-
sion of any topics related to the presence of Russia in the Baltics, is a 
concern not only to Russia, but to other Baltic countries. The most rea-
sonable groups of the Baltic States political elites are aware of the danger 
of escalating tensions in the region that even during the Cold War strove 
to follow the slogan "The Baltic Sea is a sea of friendship." Only in this 
case it will be possible to hope for the opening of a certain window of 
opportunity, if not to improve, or at least to stabilize relations between 
Russia, the Baltic countries and NATO in the Baltic Sea region. 
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